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INTRODUCTION 
 
Master Sun said: 
Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, but in 
defeating the enemy without ever fighting… 
The skilful strategist defeats the enemy without doing battle, 
captures the city without laying siege, overthrows the 
enemy state without protracted war. 
He strives for supremacy under heaven intact, his men and 
weapons still keen, his gain complete. This is the method of 
strategic attack.1 
 
Ever since the European Union (EU) first emerged as an international actor, 
much academic writing has been devoted to defining the nature of the beast and 
sticking labels on it, especially with a view to somehow mark it out as different 
from other actors. Most prominent have been the notions of the EU being a 
‘civilian power’ or, since the early 2000s, being a ‘normative power’. Both 
concepts were crafted specifically with the EU in mind, and the latter in partic-
ular, has become one of the dominant discourses on the EU’s external relations. 
However both concepts are, in the view of many, too uncritically tied to official 
EU rhetoric of being a ‘force for good’ in the world.2 Moreover, in spite of the 
copious amounts of scholarly literature generated, both concepts have been 
severely criticised for their theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Indeed, 
much literature on EU foreign policy reproduces increasingly stale debates as to 
whether or not the EU conforms to these ideal types of foreign policy actorness, 
and have, to some extent, turned significant parts of the study of EU foreign 
policy away mainstream IR – as none of these approaches have found wide-
spread usage outside of EU studies.  
In contrast, more mainstream concepts like hard and soft power, have been 
somewhat neglected. Until recently, the latter has mainly been analysed for its 
discursive (and often muddled) use by EU officials. In its original formulation, 
however, it is sadly underused for understanding the roles and impacts of norms 
and values in EU foreign policy, and is too often dismissed as an ideological 
and – even worse, in the eyes of some – American concept. Yet this mid-range 
theoretical concept – developed over the past 25 years by Joseph Nye – has 
generated far more interest outside the EU studies circles, capturing the role of 
norms and values as power assets alongside, and in an interplay with, the more 
traditional diplomatic, economic and military resources of statecraft, i.e. hard 
power. Soft power has become the modern byword for winning wars without 
                                                                          
1  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and ed. John Minford (London: Penguin Books, 2003): 
14, 16.  
2  European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy 
(Brussels, 2003): 13. 
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doing battle, for winning hearts and minds, for gaining influence and effecting 
change without expending blood and treasure. The concept is certainly not 
uncontested (as I will soon elaborate), but it has become a major feature of both 
scholarly and policy-oriented debate. Not so, however, in the EU studies com-
munity, where other concepts and abstract debates over ideal types of ‘actor-
ness’ have dominated.  
As the title of the dissertation suggests, I still consider it mistaken to speak 
of the EU as ‘being a soft power’. Yet as the dissertation will demonstrate, dis-
cussing the EU’s soft power presents lesser ontological problems than employ-
ing either of the above-mentioned ideal types. In this dissertation, I therefore 
examine the role of soft power in certain aspects of the European Union’s for-
eign policy, and the extent to which the EU seeks to incorporate it in its foreign 
policy strategies. In doing so, I am demonstrating its relevance and validity as 
part of EU studies, as a tool for analysing what kinds of intangible power of 
attraction the EU actually possesses. For the EU is of course a major force in 
the world, and the study of what kind of power and influence the EU possesses 
is important. Yet only by engaging with the issue of what the EU does, why it 
does it, by what means, and with what level of success it does it, can one gain 
greater understanding. The four peer-reviewed articles submitted as part of the 
dissertation all hold to the core understandings and assumptions of soft power 
research – that it is something you have (or do not have), not something you 
are; something that can be acquired and harnessed – or lost – yet can be frus-
tratingly difficult to use strategically. Together the four articles show that the 
soft power concept provides a more theoretically and empirically sound, alt-
hough not entirely unproblematic, conceptual lens than either civilian or nor-
mative power. At the same time, I also address the interplay between hard and 
soft power in the EU’s foreign policy, and how an imbalance between these 
holds the EU back from realising its full potential.  
In this introductory chapter, I begin with a few general observations on EU 
actorness and the means and ends of its foreign policy. I then discuss the two 
major conceptualisations of the EU as a foreign policy actor – civilian power 
and normative power – with which the soft power concept is most often con-
flated, as well as the main theoretical and empirical shortcomings of both con-
cepts. Then I elaborate the soft power concept and make clear the differences 
with the civilian power and normative power concepts. Following from this, I 
present why the soft power concept provides a better basis for understanding the 
role of norms, values and reputation in shaping perceptions of the EU and in 
making it a more effective actor, as well as outline the many avenues for further 
research the concept opens up. I will then briefly introduce the four articles that 
make up the bulk of this dissertation, outline their contribution and discuss 
subsequent developments with reference to their conclusions. This dissertation 
concludes that abandoning the futile debates in the self-referencing ghettos of 
normative and civilian power, and instead engaging with mainstream IR con-
cepts, open up far more interesting avenues for research on EU foreign policy. 
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The EU in foreign policy 
In 1982, Hedley Bull famously declared that, ““Europe” is not an actor in inter-
national affairs, and does not seem likely to become one”.3 As time has gone by, 
that has become a minority view, as the EU has increasingly established itself as 
“an entity that plays an identifiable role in international relations”.4 To those 
obsessed with state-centrism, the EU will always be a ‘hard case’, and structural 
realism in particular – being reductionist and narrowly concerned with hard 
security and competition in the ‘high politics’ fields – has difficulties 
accounting for the ever-closer cooperation between the member states, where 
anarchy and security competition ought to make it impossible.5 Having been 
sceptical of integration through the entire history of the EU, some structural 
realists even suggested that it would disintegrate, along with NATO, at the end 
of the Cold War.6 Structural realist accounts of EU foreign policy describe it as 
a vehicle for collective regional hegemony – the “repository for shared second-
order concerns” – used to steer the transition processes of the Central and East-
ern European states after the collapse of communism, thus securing the EU’s 
own security.7 
Yet, much as the EU defies easy categorisation, not least because of its 
institutional dissimilarity with states, few can deny the emergence of the EU as 
an important entity. Broaden the perspective to the various international eco-
nomic areas, the ‘low politics’, in which the EU has some degree of authority, 
and one sees a different picture. One might even argue that structural realists 
confuse actorhood with effectiveness. Even at its worst – especially in crisis 
management – the problem with the EU is rarely that it does not act at all, but 
that it is almost invariably reacting to events, and that it almost always comes 
up with too little too late. Ultimately, the fact that others recognise the EU as an 
interlocutor that wields influence is a more significant aspect than its precise 
nature.8 Thus, if others are willing to treat the EU like an actor, it is one. 
Bretherton and Vogler offer a more flexible model of actorness; partly by side-
stepping the question of what precisely the EU is, instead focusing on the three 
variables of opportunity, presence and capability.9 On this basis, they argue, one 
can proceed to examining what the EU does, how it seeks to shape its external 
                                                                          
3  Hedley Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 21, no.2 (1982): 151. 
4  Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998): 5. 
5  Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13, no 2 (2006): 219. 
6  John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, 
International Security, 15, no 1 (1990): 5–56. 
7  Hyde-Price, ‘Realist critique of NPE’, 226–227.  
8  Sabine Saurugger, Theoretical Approaches to European Integration (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014): 217.  
9  Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2006): 24. 
11 
environment, the sources of its influence and with what level of success it 
operates.10  
Christopher Hill sought to move beyond the abstract debates of actorness, 
and instead defined the issue as a gap between the EU’s capabilities and the 
expectations of what roles it could perform internationally.11 Hill discussed the 
impediments to the EU living up expectations, considering institutions and 
resources the primary obstacles – although arguably, he considered foreign 
policy effectiveness in terms of how state-like the EU can become. Karen E. 
Smith has also taken up this approach, of examining what the EU does rather 
than seeking to categorise it as an actor, by simply noting that the EU is capable 
of formulating foreign policy objectives and implementing them.12 Similarly, 
the EU has demonstrated the ability to think strategically about the ends and 
means of foreign policy13 and to rank its various priorities in order of 
importance as well as conduct opportunistic trade-offs between them.14  
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the EU acts as a great power and 
likes throwing its way around in a traditional sense. Asle Toje has put forward 
the counter-intuitive thesis that the EU is essentially misunderstood in this 
respect. Instead of looking for the traits of great power behaviour – as many are 
wont to do, to then subsequently throw doubt on its actorness when not finding 
such traits – one should recognise that the EU displays most of the character-
istics of a small power.15 Thus, its preference for international law and 
multilateralism is typical of an actor with limited power at its disposal, as is its 
reluctance to engage in geopolitical power struggles.  
What Hill called the capability-expectations gap, was primarily a question of 
actively wielding power. For the EU’s economy is the largest in the world in 
absolute terms – its nominal GDP standing at $18,5 trillion (app. 23% of the 
world total) in 201416 – and in spite of the shrinking defence budgets and low 
level of force readiness, the combined military might of the members is still 
                                                                          
10  Ibid., 36. 
11  Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, no 3 (1993): 305–328. 
12  Karen E. Smith, European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008): 2–3. 
13  Michael E. Smith, ‘A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the 
EU’s Changing Global Role’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18, no 2 (2011): 144–
163. 
14  Hubert Zimmermann, ‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China’s 
and Russia’s WTO Accession’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45, no 4 (2007): 
813–832. 
15  Asle Toje, ‘The European Union as a Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
Strategic Actorness’, European Integration, 30, no 2 (2008): 199–215; Idem, The 
European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War, (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010); Idem, ‘The European Union as a Small Power’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 49, no 1 (2011): 43–60. 
16  International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic Outlook Database’, October 2015, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx (last 
accessed 10 December 2015). 
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significant. The main problem has been adequate power conversion strategies – 
turning resources into outcomes; the usage of carrots and sticks17 – to further 
the EU’s will, whether by persuasion or coercion. The institutional set-up, with 
its many veto-players and myriad delaying mechanisms makes the EU less than 
nimble in most foreign policy decisions requiring swift and/or coercive action.18 
As coercive action, whether by economic or military means, usually generates 
greater amounts of blowback, it is often difficult to arrive at a consensus on 
taking such decisions. Therefore, “EU foreign policies are generally less 
defined by what tools are most likely to meet a specific objective, and more by 
what means can be agreed upon”.19  
Instead, the EU has tended to promote ‘milieu goals’ – that is objectives of a 
more general nature – where consensus is often easier to arrive at. Milieu goals 
can be many things – free trade, democracy, human rights, good governance, 
environmental protection and many more – where the direct cost-benefit calcu-
lation for the EU itself is not necessarily obvious.20 Although the gains from 
promoting such objectives can as easily accrue to the ‘recipient’ of EU policy as 
to the EU itself, milieu goals must not be confused with mere altruism. In gen-
eral, it is in the interest of the EU to exist in a world where democracies thrive 
and where the rules of international trade are observed. Similarly, the EU will 
become more secure, if its neighbours are stable, well-governed countries.21 
Milieu goals may with time gradually become ‘possession goals’ – that is 
objectives of a specific nature, where the purpose is control or incorporation, or 
where the gain is quantifiable – such as has been seen in the EU’s enlargement 
processes – yet this is not a given.22  
Beyond the greater ease of getting to a consensus, milieu goals have the 
added attraction that they play to the EU’s strengths. Milieu goals are achieved 
over the long term, and typically require lengthy bureaucratic processes on 
technical issues pertinent to the broader goals; that is a style of interaction in 
which the EU excels. After all, Ernst Haas once compared the EU to a 
“…bureaucratic appendage to an intergovernmental conference in permanent 
session”.23 Moreover, milieu goals are also a useful way for the EU to 
operationalize the ESS’s stated preference for ‘preventive engagement’, mainly 
by means of dialogue, support, reforms and development. “Preventive engage-
ment can help avoid more serious problems in the future”, states the ESS,24 and 
                                                                          
17  Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 10. 
18  Asle, Toje, ‘The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign 
Policy’, Security Dialogue, 39, no 1 (2008): 121–141. 
19  Ibid., 132. 
20  Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962): 73–6. 
21  ESS, 8. 
22  Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, 74. 
23  Quoted in Carsten Strøby Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, in Michelle Cini Nieves Pérez-
Solórzano Borragán (eds.), European Union Politics, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012): 66. 
24  ESS, 11.  
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the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)25 and Eastern Partnership (EaP)26 
policy frameworks have both sought to build on these notions. Generally, the 
EU has sought to encourage other countries to adopt its norms and values, and 
approximate their legislation to that of the EU. The overt means for making 
countries do so can be divided in ‘carrots’ – in the form of economic incentives 
such as development assistance, increased access to the Single Market, or finan-
cial aid to support reform processes – and, mildly, ‘sticks’, in the form of con-
ditionality, whether positive or negative. In hard power-soft power terms, all the 
tools just mentioned are hard power, in that they are tangible and have clear-cut 
effects.  
However, it is by the EU’s very adherence to such milieu goals and to the 
described modes of behaviour that scholars have been led to look at the EU as a 
unique kind of entity – most prominently the civilian and normative power 
ideas – and it is to those concepts we will now turn.  
 
 
Civilian Power Europe 
The first major concept constructed with the aim of establishing that the EU was 
a new form of actor was that of ‘civilian power’. François Duchêne coined the 
term in a slightly opaque fashion, in two much-cited articles discussing the 
international role of the EC during the early 1970s, a period marked both by 
détente in the Cold War and by the onset of the globalisation processes. Argu-
ing that the EC was unlikely to become an integrated military actor – and ques-
tioning whether such a development was even desirable – Duchêne suggested 
instead that the EC should embrace its role as a civilian power, “long on eco-
nomics and relatively short on armed force”, favouring rule-based economic 
interdependence over power politics.27 By thus employing only civilian instru-
ments, the EC could fundamentally recast international relations, ‘domesticate’ 
them, in much the same way as it had already done between the members of the 
Community. The European Community would be neatly placed, through its 
differentness, to act as a neutral arbiter between the superpowers, and thus help 
overcome the old-fashioned power competition between them. Duchêne’s origi-
nal formulation of the civilian power idea was, in fact, strikingly vague, yet, as 
                                                                          
25  European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, Brussels, 
2004. 
26  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Eastern Partnership, com (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 2008. 
27  François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: 16 Europeans Look Ahead (London: Chatham House, 1972), 32–47; Idem, 
‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in Max Kohnstam 
& Wolfgang Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the 
European Community (London: Macmillan, 1973), 1–21. 
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some observers have argued, this was also part of the reason for its ability to 
inspire debate in both academic and policymaking circles.28  
Attractive as it was from an idealist perspective, the civilian power Europe 
thesis always rested on a flawed reading of history. The absence of a military 
dimension during the first several decades of integration was more by accident 
than design. The Founding Fathers did not set out to create a civilian power, or 
to break new ground in international politics; the Community was a functional 
arrangement for specific economic sectors. Nor was military power anathema in 
the context of European integration, or considered against ‘the European spirit’. 
The member states, after all, did negotiate the European Defence Community 
(EDC) in 1952, proposing supranational control of German armed forces. The 
reason the EDC did not come into being was not that the idea of military power 
was abhorrent, but that France could not, ultimately, accept the implied loss of 
sovereign control of its armed forces and the loss of autonomy.29 Intergovern-
mentalism and the states’ kneejerk resistance to shared sovereignty in the high 
politics fields, always provided a stronger explanation than simple idealism. In 
subsequent decades, the Cold War provided a set of circumstances where 
Europe-only defence integration was hardly necessary, as NATO was the 
essential organisation, and the winding down of the European empires also 
gradually reduced the military adventurism of the member states. Once that 
context changed in the early 1990’s, defence cooperation came back on the 
agenda, although it has not been much easier to make rapid integrative progress 
than it was in the 1950’s. At most, those experiences taught lessons of modesty 
and incrementalism, and the ambitions since the 1990’s have been for more and 
better cooperation. Yet, the ‘militarisation’ of the EU began as soon as the 
international context required it. 
Hedley Bull in turn forcefully attacked Civilian Power Europe (CPE) as 
being “a contradiction in terms”.30 Bull located the CPE debate in the period 
during which Duchêne had first coined the term. From Bull’s own perspective 
ten years later, the Cold War now deep in the refreeze, such ideas seemed mis-
placed at best. Clearly, interdependence had not replaced strategic concerns, nor 
was military power giving way to economic power. The utility of military force 
was not in question, the way many at the time (and today) found it fashionable 
to claim: “The wars [Vietnam] lost by the United States ….were wars won by 
their adversaries and in no way demonstrated the impotence of military 
power”31 – a point no less relevant today as the War on Terror refuses to come 
to a happy conclusion. Moreover, “…the power and influence exerted by the 
European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a 
                                                                          
28  Jan Orbie, ‘Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debate’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 41, no 1 (2006): 123–24. 
29  Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union (Palgrave Macmillan: 
London, 2004): 57–61. 
30  Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe’. 
31  Ibid. 150.  
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strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did 
not control”.32 
By this, Bull pointed out that the EC could act in its civilian capacity only 
because the member states were not civilian themselves, and their military 
power provided the setting in which the EC could be a ‘civilian power’. This 
point is as worthwhile today as it was then. One cannot detach EU foreign pol-
icy from overall European politics. That the EU became a ‘civilian power’ was, 
as noted, mainly a fluke of history. NATO became the main military organisa-
tion in the context of the Cold War, and has remained so since due to the struc-
tured cooperation it enables with Europe’s security provider, the United States. 
Certainly, the EU derives its capabilities from economics, and only to a lesser 
extent from military means. However, when have these two organisations ever 
worked at cross-purposes or promoted radically different solutions in competi-
tion with each other? In fact, the current crisis in Ukraine shows the interplay 
between the two organisations. NATO has stepped up its efforts to ensure the 
military and physical security of its members, while the EU has worked with 
civilian means to apply pressure on Russia. The division of labour is the point, 
not the fact that different capabilities are organised in different settings. Thus, 
one cannot properly evaluate the EU’s civilian actions without any regard at all 
to the military considerations also made elsewhere in different institutional 
settings. 
Civilian Power Europe laboured on, however, and Hanns Maul has been one 
of its leading proponents. Although his early works dealt explicitly with Ger-
many and Japan, his attempt to bring greater rigour to the concept than Duchêne 
did, has become the standard definition of civilian powers. Maull defined the 
main traits of the ideal type civilian powers to be: “…a) the acceptance of the 
necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) 
the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national 
goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to 
safeguard other means of international interaction; c) a willingness to develop 
supranational structures to address critical issues of international manage-
ment.”33 At issue for Maull was therefore also that civilian powers would fur-
ther cooperation and international law as international norms, something to 
which the EU made a unique contribution.34 In other words, clear-cut cases of 
milieu goals.  
As Karen Smith has pointed out, however, these traits do not necessarily 
preclude purposeful, interest-driven action from such civilian powers, although 
it implies that the preference is rather for negotiations and persuasion than for 
coercion. However, civilian means are one thing, being a civilian power quite 
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another. It is usually difficult in international affairs to pinpoint precisely the 
point where positive inducement ends and coercion begins, even when staying 
within so-called civilian means.35 Moreover, it is difficult to use the ideal type 
of actorhood, in as much as virtually all states conduct themselves mostly by 
civilian means, and the ideal type lacks a real opposite. For what state or actor 
can truly be said to consistently prefer military or militarised means to diplo-
macy in all its dealings with the world? 36 All states, whether tending towards 
the more or less hawkish, are to be found somewhere along a continuum, as all 
engage in diplomacy and none are entirely free of military power.37  
As the EU has gradually enhanced its military capacity, the natural question 
is therefore whether it is still to be considered a civilian power at all. As 
Whitman argues, the development since the launch of the ESDP in 1999 has on 
the one hand made the concept threadbare. However, the European Security 
Strategy also reads as an at least partial affirmation of some of the civilian 
objectives and traits that CPE scholars have previously highlighted.38 Ian 
Manners, however, have posited that the very militarization of the EU, however 
limited, will necessarily lead to “a Brussels-based military-industrial simplex” 
(sic) gradually abandoning civilian means for military ones, and thus also to 
change its objectives.39 Others argue that as long the military component 
remains only for self-defence, or for ends considered civilian in nature – such as 
peacekeeping, state-building, humanitarian interventions or “civilizing interna-
tional relations” – the CPE concept still holds.40 Such definitions stretch the 
concepts to breaking point. Are the anti-piracy operations off Somalia’s coast, 
in themselves military, thus to be considered ‘civilian’ because they safeguard 
EU economic activity and provide a global public good? Whatever else may fall 
under that category then? As Smith, with deliberate facetiousness suggests, 
NATO, based as it is on collective defence, has as much claim to the civilian 
power mantle as the EU does, not least since the latter’s military capabilities are 
explicitly developed for out-of-area operations.41 The more the concept is 
stretched for the sake of accommodating the EU, the less sense it makes as an 
analytical tool. Moreover, it does not sit well with the relatively frequent utter-
ances by EU leaders that the union must in time go all the way, and develop its 
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own armed forces. Thus, Jean-Claude Juncker stated in early 2015, that an EU 
army is essential for EU credibility.42 Smith concluded – with regret, and cer-
tainly in vain – that the old Civilian Power Europe concept/ideal type was dead. 
Instead of continuing to pore over what kind of power the EU is, the academic 
community should move on to analysing what the EU does and should be doing 
as an international actor.43  
 
 
Normative Power Europe 
Ian Manners unleashed Normative Power Europe (NPE) on the world in 2002.44 
Instead of discussing the EU as being either a civilian or a military power, 
Manners invited scholars to think beyond such traditional categories. The new 
understanding was of the EU as being a shaper of norms and of conceptions of 
‘normal’ in international politics. The EU derived this power by its hybrid 
political form, its history, and its ‘constitution’. These have combined to make 
the Union an exponent of a number of core norms, the most important of which 
are peace, democracy and human rights. Moreover, the EU’s attachment to 
these norms and its very difference from pre-existing political forms, pre-
disposes it to act in a normative way that is in keeping with and for the further-
ance of its norms.45 The example he provides is the EU’s pursuit of the global 
abolition of capital punishment. Manners lists a number of diffusion mecha-
nisms by which the EU spreads these norms to other actors with which it comes 
into contact, such as conditionality clauses, financial inducements and persua-
sion. However, “…the most important factor shaping the international role of 
the EU is not what it does or what it says but what it is”.46 
Since Manners’ original formulation of the concept, it has been further 
refined by both him and others, and has been the subject of significant criticism. 
It has been argued that NPE is first and foremost a question of Ian Manners 
seeking to create an identity for the EU, and that the concept implies normative 
superiority.47 Identities can, naturally, be positively defined, and at first sight so 
is Manners’s. Moreover, Manners insists that his concept is not merely Western, 
since in its pursuit of the abolition of capital punishment, the EU rubs against 
both the US and China.48 What Diez points to is that if an identity is crafted 
around being ‘normative’, i.e. ‘good’, then ‘othering’ processes can quickly 
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lead to negative judgements regarding others’ normativity.49 Manners has coun-
tered that the EU promotes universal values, draws its normative basis from the 
ideas of cosmopolitanism, and that the concept is indeed ideational, prescribing 
what the EU should strive towards being.50 Yet to argue that the EU’s goals are 
cosmopolitan virtually amounts to claiming that EU norms themselves are uni-
versal. As Tocci warns, one must beware of “…[sliding] into an imperialistic 
imposition of what is subjectively considered ‘good’ on the grounds of its pre-
sumed universality. Doing so is not only problematic in and of itself, but would 
also lead us back to a definition of normativity which is inextricably tied to 
power and power-based relations.”51 
What Manners and Diez both agree on, is that normative power only applies 
to the EU, and not to other major powers/actors, especially not the United 
States. Normative power may co-exist with other forms, but it will inevitably 
diminish the more in contact it comes with other forms of power, especially 
military.52 Manners, already in his original 2002 piece, rejected the view that 
normative power required military power behind it, or implied a willingness to 
use military force for normative purposes.53 He has since further expressed his 
concern that the ‘militarisation’ of the EU in the wake of the ESS has been 
entirely negative, will undermine the EU’s unique normative being, lead it 
towards colonial-style behaviour and lead it away from the pursuit of ‘sustain-
able peace’. “…the militarization of the EU risks making it more like bigger 
and better great powers, whilst leaving the problems of interstate politics pre-
cisely where they were”, “…like Arendt’s ‘lost treasures’, the normative power 
of the EU will be lost”.54 Effectively, the EU, as it were, would be committing 
the terrible mistake of abandoning the very identity Ian Manners had tried to 
create for it.  
In one sense, the claims behind Normative Power Europe are of course quite 
true. The EU wields significant normative power, in that it defines ‘normal’ in 
much of its extended neighbourhood. The Copenhagen Criteria lays down 
benchmarks for potential candidates; the treaty base and the acquis communau-
taire also provides legal templates that states cannot deviate far from when 
seeking closer relationships with the EU; and members commit themselves to 
sets of norms and values that they cannot disregard without facing either legal 
action at the ECJ or ostracism among other member states. It is in the further 
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claim that the EU is a normative power that the problems start piling up; for can 
an actor truly be pre-disposed to act normatively? Most of the evidence for the 
NPE thesis comes from pointing out Europe’s rhetorical commitment to various 
human rights regimes,55 or to the way it imposes its norms on weaker states 
through conditionality clauses. However, the normative power proponents have 
two big blind spot. One is that norm imposition through conditionality, however 
right and justified the imposer thinks it, remains coercive and thus hardly in 
keeping with the EU’s normative being. Another is in situations where the EU’s 
normative agenda is not so easy to implement or where the EU has to compro-
mise between priorities. This is where most critics have levelled their charges 
and the evidence gets sketchy. 
Helene Sjursen complains that the entire concept is too closely tied to the EU 
self-perception and to official rhetoric, and that only by distancing itself from 
that will it gain analytical value.56 Moreover, she argues, the idea of the EU 
being a ‘force for good’ lacks criteria by which to measure it, and seems to run 
into empirical problems when looking at the EU’s actual foreign policy perfor-
mance. Adrian Hyde-Price argues that the concept is reductionist and evidence 
of the authors’ positive disposition towards the EU. The EU’s international 
actorhood is better understood as an attempt at collective regional hegemony, of 
milieu shaping around a set of shared second-order concerns (such as democ-
racy promotion and opposition to capital punishment).57  
The same question as with Civilian Power arises in this context too: Can one 
make a complete distinction between what the EU is and stands for and what 
the member states are on their own? Few would claim that the European states 
are all normatively predisposed, and only act in accordance with deeply held 
norms and values. Indeed, it often seems more like the member states deliber-
ately deposit their normative concerns in the EU’s foreign policy, and then feel 
liberated to act in a purely interest-oriented fashion each on their own, occa-
sionally to the detriment of the collective EU interest. Energy relationships with 
Russia,58 or most countries’ trade relations with China, and simultaneous silence 
on human rights,59 are cases in point.60 The complete distinction between the 
EU and its member states, which the NPE idea implies, makes little sense; one 
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must almost imagine a perp hauled before the court on charges of GBH, only to 
argue that he is a uniquely peaceful man, but for his body and brain.  
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, much debate focuses on whether 
the EU has indeed acted as a normative power. How can a foreign policy iden-
tity that does not only have a normative element, but which is defined first and 
foremost by the normative element, be operationalized? Manners and Diez 
argue that a true normative power will not just act in pursuit of normative goals, 
but will do so only by normative means, that is the means must themselves 
conform to the core norms.61 Tocci further adds that a policy must also have a 
normative impact if an actor is to be understood as ‘normative’. Therefore, 
being a normative power depends on “…what an actor wants (its goals), how it 
acts (the deployment of its policy means) and what it achieves (its impact).”62 
As Forsberg comments, when the bar is set as high as Manners, Diez and Tocci 
do, Normative Power Europe is more an ideal type than a descriptive concept of 
the EU.63 
Kristi Raik highlighted the tension between normative goals and normative 
means, and the difficulty of employing the ideal types for actual analysis of 
events. Her study of EU responses to peaceful mass protests in neighbouring 
countries – seemingly an ideal case for a normative power – showed that the EU 
most often favoured political stability rather than normative change. Either that 
or it abandoned normative means in order to pursue normative aims. Alterna-
tively, it simply failed to act altogether.64 It is also remarkable, that in the 
Middle East and North Africa the EU was, prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, 
largely content to do deals with whoever was in charge and could guarantee 
stability (and control illegal migration). Thus, rather than being a force for 
democratic change, the EU was supporting repressive regimes with the most 
awful human rights records.65 One might further question whether the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy, with its negative effect on Third World economic 
development, is evidence of an actor committed to a universal norm of social 
solidarity. The list goes on, but as Woods concludes, the main determining fac-
tor in whether the EU did or did not pursue normative-oriented policies was 
whether it was the stronger party to a negotiation, and that the issue threatened 
no vital interests, i.e. was of the second-order sort.66 Alternatively, one could 
argue that the EU has been at its most normative when kicking down open 
doors, or when it has exercised hegemonic power, e.g. in the accession negotia-
tions. Ultimately, as Jolyon Howorth has argued,  
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“The debate over ‘Normative Power Europe’ is largely an irrelevance. Of course 
the EU will continue to pursue norms-based effective multilateralism; of course 
it will continue to promote a world in which human rights, human security, 
international institutions and international law will replace the laws of the jungle. 
But if those objectives are actually to be achieved, the EU must have the entire 
range of policy instruments, including a significant measure of hard power.”67 
 
That does not mean, however, that the role of norms and values as sources of 
power are to be lightly dismissed. But whereas both civilian and normative 
power are ideational concepts, ideal types, the soft power concept, to which we 
shall now turn, theorises and describes a specific form of power states or actors 
may or may not enjoy and how.68 
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SOFT POWER 
What is soft power? 
The whole debate on soft power centres heavily on Joseph Nye, who originally 
coined the term, defining it as “the ability to get others to want the same as you 
want, without coercion or payment,” and doing so based on such commodities 
as cultural appeal, political values and legitimate policies.69 Moreover, through 
Nye’s engagement with the arguments of his critics, he has continued defining, 
and refining, the concept over the past 25 years. Nye’s basic idea when talking 
soft power was not new as such – nor has Nye claimed that it is very original – 
but simply tries to elaborate on the notion that ‘image’, reputation, culture can 
in themselves be important power assets. Less kindly, some have argued that it 
is merely to package foreign policy in business school ideas of branding and 
marketing.70  
Nye first used the term in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, in which he argued 
that contrary to the then-widespread notions of America’s relative decline in the 
world after the Cold War, its abundance of cultural and ideological appeal – 
what Nye then termed ‘soft power’ – through its, would go a long way towards 
offsetting such decline.71 It was not until 2002 that Nye returned to the topic of 
soft power. By then the US had enjoyed a decade as the world’s only super-
power, and Nye’s message was now one of caution, lest America acted arro-
gantly and unilaterally in the wake of the 9–11 terrorist attacks.72 That same 
warning was delivered with even greater urgency in 2004, when Nye fully 
developed the soft power concept in an eponymous book, and elaborated on its 
interplay with more traditional ‘hard power’ (i.e. military, economic and other 
coercive/inducing means).73 The definitions and arguments presented in that 
book formed the basis for much subsequent debate and critique, which Nye 
answered in several articles. In 2011, he then elaborated on the concept once 
more, this time as part of a broader discussion of the changing nature of power 
in contemporary international relations.74 
Power, to Nye, “…is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get 
the outcomes one wants”,75 which obviously follows closely from Robert 
Dahl’s classic definition of relational power as: “A has power over B to the 
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extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”76 Yet, 
he develops this point further, by discussing both the means for framing agen-
das, thereby restricting the choices of one’s interlocutors and removing the need 
for actively pushing them, and, most significantly, the ways in which A can 
change B’s underlying preferences.77 For the latter point, Nye relies partly on 
Steven Lukes’ ‘third dimension of power’, which holds that influencing the 
preferences and choices of others does not necessarily entail conflictual rela-
tions, as the ‘first’ and ‘second’ dimensions of power seem to suggest.78  
Nye divides power into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. The former encompasses all 
the traditional, tangible elements of power – military might, economic wealth 
etc. – and the myriad policies associated with their usage. These are, in other 
words, the ‘carrots and sticks’ by which international politics is conducted. Soft 
power consists of the rather more elusive concept, attractiveness. Sources of 
soft power are cultural appeal, insofar as a culture conveys a positive image of a 
country and a society; political norms and values, when seen as desirable and 
applied without hypocrisy; and policies, if they are seen as embodying a 
society’s values, and if the larger goals pursued are seen as legitimate and desir-
able.79 If harnessed properly, such intangibles as the power of attraction, and the 
ability to exert influence on the preferences of others can become a distinct 
form of power. If “hard power is push, soft power is pull”.80 The desirability of 
getting one’s way without having to resort to coercions or material inducements 
is self-evident, and if an interlocutor shares one’s basic objectives, the cost of 
getting them to act in accordance with your wishes will be much less than 
otherwise. Thus, having soft power can significantly reduce an actor’s costs in 
both carrots and sticks.81 
Given Joseph Nye’s stature as one of the preeminent ‘liberal’ scholars of 
international relations, the temptation has been for many to dismiss soft power 
as mere idealism, or to take issue with its intangibility. As Christopher Layne 
has argued,  
 
“Soft power as a concept is beguiling, but as a theoretical construct it is not 
robust. Indeed, on close examination, soft power is just a pithy term for multi-
lateralism, institutionalism, the democratic peace theory and the role of norms in 
international politics.”82 
 
Structural realists, in their quest for theoretical parsimony, tend towards strictly 
metric definitions of power and capabilities, and thence its systemic distribu-
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tion. Kenneth Waltz stated that “[States’] rank depends on how they score on all 
of the following items: size of the population and territory, resource endow-
ment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and compe-
tence”.83 John Mearsheimer divides power even more simplistically into 
military power and latent power, which is the ability to generate military 
power.84 Such a ‘lump concept of power’ has largely remained de rigueur 
among contemporary structural realists.85 The classical realists, in contrast, did 
not have such a limited view of the world. In addition to military and economic 
power, E.H. Carr wrote at length about the ‘power over opinion’, outlining the 
way modern communication technologies had added new dimensions to inter-
national politics.86 Hans Morgenthau stressed the importance of national morale 
in the face of others, and of the importance of a state’s values and reputation in 
the eyes of the world: 
 
“…the strugge for power on the international scene is today …in a specific sense 
a struggle for the minds of men. The power of a nation, then, depends not only 
upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon 
the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political institu-
tions, and political policies.”87 
 
What Joseph Nye has done with the soft power concept, is essentially to theo-
rise and expand on such dynamics as the great realist Morgenthau described. 
The soft power concept is not idealism; it is not about altruism either, but out-
lines that there are intangible ways of furthering interests. It merely demon-
strates an additional facet of power, which one ignores at one’s own peril. Nye 
does not deny the importance of the metric calculation, or of the quantifiable 
elements of power, but argues that it is overly simplistic and may lead to wrong 
results when applied uncritically and without consideration of specifics of a 
situation.88 The more accurate measure of power is not the simple counting of 
tanks, missiles and GDP, but the assessment of what actually influences behav-
iour in a given context.89  
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In spite of how hard and soft power are often spoken of in public discourse, 
the two are not, in fact, alternatives to, or in opposition to one another.90 Power 
resources are not fungible the way money is.91 Instead of either-or, hard or soft, 
power resources and behaviours are better viewed as a spectrum, ranging from 
the unambiguously hard military means to the soft co-opting.92 It is therefore 
not accurate to say, as some do, that Nye argues against any utility of military 
force.93 In fact, he has explicitly rejected that particular notion several times.94 
At most, Nye questions the relative utility of military power for imposing one’s 
own preferences, as military force has become very costly in the 21st century – 
and particularly difficult to sustain for democracies. It remains essential, how-
ever, for maintaining security, for defensive purposes, and as a last resort for 
maintaining the credibility of one’s policies. Rather, his criticism is of an exclu-
sive focus on military power, to the neglect of other forms.95 Strategies that 
effectively combine hard and soft power – smart power – will always be the 
most likely to secure national interests. Relying only on hard power will even-
tually become too expensive for any actor, especially if their values and policies 
repel, as they will face strong opposition. Lyndon B. Johnson is supposed to 
have said that “when you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will 
follow”.96 Yet, this assumes that one can keep one’s grip and keep squeezing, in 
other words maintain coercion. History is full of examples of states who failed 
to permanently impose their will by brute force alone, or whose empires col-
lapsed the moment their coercive power dissipated. Actors with only soft 
power, on the other hand, may win hearts but hardly minds, as unbalanced 
power resources will most likely leave an actor weak and ineffective, and 
potential partners and allies exposed to threats with little hope of support. 
Effective usage of resources depends on developing appropriate power conver-
sion strategies.97 The key to that, in turn, is”…the intuitive diagnostic skills that 
helps policymakers align tactics with objectives to creative smart strategies”.98  
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The accruement and wielding of soft power 
Soft power works through the “… cooptive means of framing the agenda, per-
suading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred out-
comes”.99 Attraction, which is the basis for soft power, can work in two ways: 
The passive/indirect form, in which A attracts B without actively having done 
much. This is what is meant by being ‘the city on the hill’. It is also what hap-
pens when others simply observe what an actor is doing, and decide to align. 
The active approach is when A actively seeks to create the attraction.100 The key 
point is creating an enabling environment, in which A’s actions will be 
positively received; nothing tangible changes for A, but the context in B can be 
changed.  
Changing enabling environments is part of the pursuit of milieu goals. When 
promoting democracy, human rights, free market economics etc., “….target of 
soft power is broad public opinion and cultural attitudes”.101 Soft power, of 
course, is not culturally neutral. What is attractive in one place may not be in 
another. Yet, culture need not necessarily present an insurmountable obstacle 
either.102 It is the kind of resource that can over time, if properly harnessed, help 
change the underlying perceptions among an actor’s interlocutors of their own 
preferences. One means for building soft power, the enabling environment, the 
attraction in the eyes of others, is through public diplomacy. Unlike traditional 
diplomacy, which targets governments, public diplomacy targets foreign 
societies and organisations directly.103 Public diplomacy is the spread of infor-
mation. It also serves as an outlet for broadcasting one’s values to the world, for 
explaining one’s policies and actions and for creating positive narratives.104 Yet, 
as with most soft power assets, public and informational has to be developed 
and sustained over time.105  
An essential feature of public diplomacy is therefore the credibility of the 
narrative and the trustworthiness of the sender. As E.H. Carr notes, before dis-
cussing the increasing importance of the varied uses of propaganda in the mod-
ern world, “the art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equip-
ment of a political leader”.106 Yet Carr also acknowledged that the tools of 
blatant propaganda could easily become self-defeating, that power over opinion 
could never be absolute, and that to be successful it would always be “… lim-
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ited by the necessity of some measure of conformity with fact.”107 Nye also 
stresses, that propaganda in its crudest forms rarely translates into soft power, 
precisely because it is a packaged glimpse of an actor’s culture, and often trans-
parently so. In such cases, the underlying values on display do not inspire or 
attract others in the same way that values freely expressed may do.108  
The problem of soft power, as opposed to hard power, is that it is more 
dependent on the recipient than on the sender.109 The messages and narratives 
transmitted through public diplomacy cannot always be accurately targeted. The 
concept of soft power does not assume that recipients, or targets, of soft power 
are merely passive. It is, after all, an actor-centred theory. Rather, their choices 
and actions may be influenced by their changing perceptions of preferences. 
However, perceptions of attraction are not necessarily always accurate; “the 
sender knows what she says, but not always what the target hears”.110 Moreover, 
it is not always easy to know who precisely is listening and being influenced by 
what they hear.111  
Partly this is because many of the instruments and resources of public 
diplomacy and soft power do not actually reside with governments, but with the 
multiple non-state actors that make up societies. In the modern age, where the 
number of information outlets are virtually infinite, governments cannot control 
information. Moreover, governments are far from always the most trusted enti-
ties around. NGOs and civil society organisations can have greater credibility 
and be less controversial in some cases than governments, for instance in 
democracy and human rights promotion.112 Although these organisations will 
often pursue their own agendas, they can nevertheless be useful partners in 
public diplomacy. They also have access to the kinds of communication net-
works that governments sometimes find it difficult to establish. NGOs can thus 
help create the enabling environment, yet at the same time, they also depend on 
it. The role of governments is then to help facilitate cross-border contacts.113  
In a critical assessment of the interplay between hard and soft power, the 
eminent strategy scholar Colin Gray complains that soft power not only defies 
metric quantification, but that – partly for the same reason – it “…does not lend 
itself to careful…calibration”, nor strategic deployment.114 He is basically right 
on both counts. Soft power cannot be ‘wielded’ or ‘exercised’ the way most 
hard power can; it is essentially a passive form of power. For that reason it is 
somewhat misleading when in public debate, the recommendation is made to 
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‘use’ soft power. While public diplomacy and information strategies, as well as 
clear engagement with those one seeks to influence, are clearly essential 
elements, the basis for applying soft power as a tool is fairly limited and 
dependent on several contextual preconditions being met.115 Thus, a number of 
qualifications are needed, in order to understand the mechanisms of soft power, 
and the role of values and policies in building it.  
Soft power as a concept does not presuppose any specific way of being; it is 
something you have, not something you are. It is not a prescription for an ideal 
type of actorhood; attraction, after all, is in the eyes of the beholder. On a super-
ficial reading, one may find several overlaps with Ian Manners’ normative 
power, discussed above, in that both concepts are about norms, values and 
oozing and diffusing. But soft power is not about ‘being’, it is one end of a 
spectrum, whereas normative power is completely aside from all other kinds of 
power. Moreover, the soft power concept does not hold the same kind of value 
judgement, nor the claim to universality, that is inherent in normative power. 
Whereas the latter is perceived by its proponents as always being positive, soft 
power is far from always ‘good’ in any objective, absolute or normative sense. 
After all, as Nye notes, “Hitler, Stalin and Mao all possessed a great deal of soft 
power in the eyes of their acolytes, but that did not make it good.”116 Soft power 
is not harnessed for the good of the world, nor is it meant to deliver universal 
goods. It is for the sake of furthering one’s interests that one will be mindful of 
maintaining one’s soft power. It is a descriptive concept, not a normative one. 
As noted above, the policies a state or actor pursues can be one source of 
soft power, if others see these as legitimate and free of hypocrisy. Such policies 
are not derived from being, as opposed to saying and doing (to quote 
Manners).117 Quite the contrary, benevolent policies are willed actions; they are 
a function of saying and doing, and may incidentally help build soft power as 
far as they shape others’ perceptions of one’s being. However, to accrue soft 
power through one’s policies requires a certain consistency, both between rhet-
oric and action, and over time. As already noted, soft power defies strategic 
deployment. It is important for long-term milieu goals, but offers little for 
securing short-term goals.118 It is excellent to possess soft power when having to 
ask for favours from others, but only hard power can be actively used to secure 
tangible outcomes when cooperation is not easily forthcoming. Hence, the 
warning against the frequent mistake in public discourse on soft power, of 
drawing the inference that it replaces hard power.119 The bigger question is how 
such hard power resources are used. Or, indeed, if one can speak of a ‘soft 
power usage of hard power’?  
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If the usage of hard power is in a responsible manner, which others see as 
legitimate, it can enhance an actor’s reputation. Therefore, even full-scale appli-
cation of military force can, in some circumstances – e.g. collective defence or 
humanitarian interventions – become a significant source of soft power. So 
while Manners argues that military power detracts from normative power if the 
two exist alongside one another,120 there is no inherent contradiction between 
using all forms of hard power while building soft power. As Robert Cooper puts 
it: “Soft power is the velvet glove, but behind it there is always the iron fist”.121 
In most cases, multilateralism would seem the preferred approach when using 
hard power, as it can bestow legitimacy and build one’s reputation for openness 
to others’ views. However, as Nye argues, “[many critics] confuse the actions of 
a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources used to produce 
those outcomes… this means that many different types of resources can con-
tribute to soft power, not that the term ‘soft power’ can mean any type of 
behavior.”122 Even so, the occasional departure from such a modus operandi 
will typically be more easily forgiven, if one generally behaves according to the 
pattern.123  
Having the hard power resources needed to pursue one’s goals still remains 
essential, however. Soft power may change underlying preferences, but in itself 
does not lead to many results. No matter how much soft power a state pos-
sesses, it can still find itself without either power or influence if others fear that 
the short-term cost of aligning with it are too high. Conversely, no state can in 
the long run operate its foreign policy on hard power alone, as the cost of such 
strategies will eventually become prohibitive. Therefore, the balance between 
different hard power capabilities is crucial for maintaining credibility – and 
indirectly for building soft power.124 For it is dependent on an actor being seen 
as standing up for its values and doing so fairly consistently. As Nye comments, 
soft power is “…hard to use, easy to lose, and costly to re-establish”.125  
 
 
Studying soft power 
The soft power concept has been criticised in numerous ways. Some say it is not 
theoretically robust.126 Others that its utility is limited due to the unclear prem-
ise of ‘attraction’ on which it is based.127 Others criticise the fluidity of the 
concept. In the words of Leslie Gelb: “Soft power now seems to mean almost 
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everything”.128 These criticisms do hit a sore spot in that soft power research is 
inherently difficult, and does tend to be a bit, well, ‘soft’. As it is contextual, 
and difficult to quantify, it falls foul of structural realism’s parsimony. As stated 
above, soft power rarely has direct causal effect on behaviours in the short term. 
It is difficult to ever properly produce ‘the smoking gun’, the unambiguous 
proof that soft power alone created an outcome or was decisive among several 
variables in a complex situation. In fact, it is most often easier to identify the 
situations where soft power has not influenced decisions or been trumped by 
other considerations.129 Soft power’s impact can only be inferred over the 
medium to long term and must take context into account.130  
Kearn argues that the very context-dependence of the soft power concept is a 
major weakness:  
 
“Soft power seems highly dependent on a context of interdependent, rule-gov-
erned interactions between states that share fundamental goals and values. Soft 
power is most likely to be relevant in the presence of a hegemonic power, as it 
provides the ideational basis for the hegemon’s perceived legitimacy as the 
leader of a given system”. 131 
 
Soft power certainly has the most obvious impact in such situations, as the 
European Union’s regional role (to which we shall shortly turn) attests. How-
ever, the critique implicitly assumes that states are the only actors, and that they 
are entirely unitary and free of influence from below. Yet, the values held by 
governments may not always be in accord with public opinion or popular aspi-
rations, as many an overthrown autocrat can attest to. Soft power may also have 
an impact in situations of power competition between great powers, as seen 
during the Cold War. Thus, Colin Gray may be going a bit too far when arguing 
that “…the contexts wherein [soft power] would be most useful are precisely 
those where it is least likely to work its magic successfully”.132 The soft power 
of small states, however, and the ways it can be effective, is an underexplored 
topic, though Israel’s appeal and success in influencing American foreign policy 
shows it can work. 
However, if inference is the main way of showing soft power at work, how 
can one go about it? One parameter can be the penetration of one country’s 
culture into the markets of another. One measurement, proposed by Nye, is the 
number of foreign students seeking to study in a country. Another is the amount 
of tourism a country attracts. A third measure is the consumption of a country’s 
cultural products. Culture, whether high or popular, is, after all, one of the core 
elements of soft power, which transmits an image of country and its society. 
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The precise impact of cultural attraction, though, is sometimes presented 
through anecdotal evidence. 
Although the evidence is mostly qualitative, one attempt at quantifying soft 
power is the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index, which was published annually 
between 2011 and 2013.133 The indexes take Nye’s three categories as starting 
points, but then subdivides them further. Under five main headings – govern-
ment, culture, diplomacy, education, and business/innovation – scores are given 
on fifty separate parameters, so as to get a measure the appeal and effectiveness 
of the states in question. The indexes therefore do not just try measure the 
potential for soft power, but also for channeling it. The acknowledged weakness 
of the indexes is the subjective element; somebody chooses categories and 
defines what will elicit a ‘high grade’. Interestingly, Japan was the only non-
Western country to ever make the top10 in this index, suggesting a certain 
Western bias. None of the non-democratic great powers like Russia or China 
made the top20. Moreover, the index applies a lumping method, where different 
sources and channels of soft power are simply added together. It leaves context 
out of the equation, namely that various aspects of what makes up soft power 
may be perceived differently in various places. 
Public opinion research can be another indicator of soft power at play, alt-
hough exact causation can be difficult to discern until after the event.134 Critics 
counter that public opinion can be brittle: “The effects of soft power can be 
observed through polling one day but vanish the next”.135 Firstly, this assumes 
that states and governments are completely unconstrained by public opinion. 
Secondly, it ignores that soft power is mainly observable in retrospect. Polling 
data over extended periods, moreover, can reveal significant trends. Pew 
Research Center has collected a sizeable series of data in its ‘Global Attitudes 
and Trends’ database on the relative perception of different powers in the eyes 
of others, and of their relative standing in the world.136 Thirdly, it reflects a 
tendency to view international affairs through specific instances of conflict, 
while ignoring broader patterns of cooperation. In this case, it is interesting to 
note how the US’s reputation took a knock in the immediate aftermath of the 
Iraq invasion, especially in European eyes. Much of that, however, was bound 
up with the person of the then-president. A few years later and with a new 
president in place, the country’s reputation was once more soaring.137 That the 
US accomplished this turnaround in its international standing with only minor 
changes in actual policy surely testifies to a deeper attraction and soft power at 
play.  
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Another way of discerning soft power at play is, naturally, through observed 
behaviour, which cannot be explained through the most parsimonious models 
reducing states’ interests to mere calculations of the systemic distribution of 
material power. It can involve studying societal preference formation rather 
than black boxing the state. This is in tune with the so-called Innenpolitik, or 
liberal approaches to studying foreign policy.138 In that sense soft power 
becomes a supporting hypothesis – as befits a mid-range theory – for the emer-
gence of the preferences states act upon – which historical evidence can confirm 
or disconfirm as it becomes available. Since states’ foreign policies are deter-
mined by the attitudes of individuals or of social groups as well as the percep-
tions of the configuration of other states’ preferences, soft power can be a con-
tributing factor in the shaping of policy.139 How others react to a country, be it 
decision-makers or the general public, is a way of discerning soft power. This 
even more so in circumstances where the preferences of individuals or societal 
groups matter and can be decisive.140 Neoclassical realism also seeks to escape 
the black-boxing of the state by adding intervening variables to the analysis of 
foreign policy, placing particular emphasis on historical evidence (process 
tracing) and intra-state politics, including perceptions and ideologies.141 In this 
approach soft power can be an intervening variable. States may be influenced 
by the soft power of others, but may also seek to incorporate it into their own 
grand strategies in accordance with their perceptions of what means are appro-
priate in a given context.142  
Evaluation of the effectiveness of soft power must therefore always be 
viewed in the context of a state’s overall policy strategy. Yet, the line between 
self-interest and the influence of soft power can be a fine one; states may expect 
future gains from a certain policy orientation and let that guide their decisions. 
However, states do not always act with clear material motives. Choices of who 
one aligns with will also be a matter of identity and of deeply held values. Soft 
power helps such decisions along, although, as noted, isolating its impact from 
other variables is not always easy.  
 
 
A lesser contradiction in terms? 
Unlike the civilian and normative power concepts discussed above, the concept 
of soft power was not created specifically with the EU in mind, leading to a 
certain hesitancy in the academic community about using it to examine EU 
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foreign policy. Manners and Diez have tried dismissing the concept as 
“…located in American politics of Democrats’ soft power versus Republicans’ 
hard power.”143 This is both bizarre and downright wrong, although they did get 
Nye’s party affiliation right. Nye himself makes very clear that one cannot just 
replace one kind of power with the other, which makes the dichotomy Diez and 
Manners set up a strawman. In fact, it is a question of ‘horses for courses’; thus, 
military force is indispensable in certain contexts. It was therefore always 
wrong to claim, as some have, that through its soft power, “…Europe has made 
hard power less necessary”144 Nye’s real argument, that building soft power 
lessens costs in both ‘carrots and sticks’ surely transcends both partisan politics 
and the transatlantic gap. Moreover, although it is true that Nye draws most of 
his examples from the US’ role in the world, he devotes considerable space in 
his books to comparisons with other countries and their soft power potential, 
amply demonstrating the concept’s universal applicability, as do the IfG-
Monocle soft power indexes. Yet soft power remains an underused conceptual 
lens in EU studies.  
A few constructivists took EU officials’ discursive use of the term during 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s tenure as RELEX Commissioner (2004–2009) under 
examination, seeking to tease out the Commissioner’s underlying world-
view.145 Ferrero-Waldner tended to refer to the EU, in as much as it preferred 
persuasion to confrontation, as not just having, but also as being a soft power. In 
this Ferrero-Waldner’s understanding of the term was in fact closer to 
Duchêne’s and Maull’s CPE concept than to Joseph Nye’s original definition.146 
In articles, the Commissioner wrote of “leveraging the EU’s soft power”, while 
alluding to positive conditionality and economic incentives under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.147 Less kindly, one might conclude that to Ferrero-
Waldner, EU soft power was pretty much whatever the EU did with civilian 
means that worked out well. Being a civilian power – if that is indeed what the 
EU is – can in itself be a source of soft power, and also provide s avenues for 
the EU to channel its soft power.148 Yet the two are not the same kind of power 
at all, civilian power describing a way of being. Ferrero-Waldner is not alone, 
though, with this basic misunderstanding. During one of the televised 
Spitzenkandidat debates ahead of the 2014 European Parliament elections, Jean-
Claude Juncker declared, while fielding a question on European foreign and 
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security policy, that “here in Europe, we are a soft power…we have to use the 
tools of a soft power”.149  
Other scholars have discussed whether the EU’s self-presentation as reliant 
on soft power and persuasion was in itself enough to bridge the capability-
expectations gap (the conclusion was no).150 As part of his realist critique of 
normative power Europe, Hyde-Price mentioned soft power as one of the EU’s 
tools, alongside economic incentives and conditionality clauses, for exercising 
collective regional hegemony, but did not elaborate on the dynamics of its use 
or impact.151 The first thorough discussion of what makes EU soft power was by 
Christopher Hill, who concluded that the elements of soft power was generally 
sought integrated in EU foreign policies.152 He did also argue, however, that 
further investment in traditional capabilities was necessary if the EU should 
derive the most benefit from its soft power. That particular viewpoint is not 
often shared by the civilian and normative power scholars, and certainly not by 
Ian Manners. In fact, as Biscop and Coelmont observe, among many scholars of 
the Civilian and normative power debates, there is almost an assumption that 
traditional power exertion is simply wrong for the EU.153 
Yet EU power, hard and soft, can be studied the same way as any other 
state’s, and by the same tools as for states. It has interests it pursues and it mar-
shals the resources for doing so. All of the same dynamics Nye outlined in his 
work on the soft power concept can be observed in the case of the EU and its 
external relations. The EU has various sources of soft power that it more or less 
consciously seeks to convert into influence. Its various strategies show it at least 
trying to think of how to make its soft power count in its favour. In international 
comparison, it is interesting to note, that four EU members ranked in the top 10 
of the 2013 edition of the IfG-Monocle soft power index.154 This suggests that 
European societies and their values seem appealing in the eyes of the outside 
world, although the cultural sources of soft power may mainly be located at the 
national levels. What the EU has created – in the shape of the well-regulated 
single market and the prosperity which integration has brought to the partici-
pating states – may also strengthen the EU’s image in the world. Alternatively, 
the near-constant crisis mode since 2010 also has the potential to diminish the 
EU’s reputation. 
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The official historical narrative of peaceful integration among previously 
warring states has also been used to paint a positive picture of the EU.155 So 
have the successive enlargement processes, which have expanded the union to 
28 members. Kearn’s view that soft power is most effective in situations where 
a hegemonic power seeks legitimacy can of course be invoked in this context;156 
the EU can be considered the regional hegemon, with only Russia and Turkey 
competing (and the US supporting EU hegemony). Yet that does not change 
that EU is enormously attractive to many non-members, and that these freely 
choose to apply for membership. In fact, nothing could be a clearer example of 
EU soft power than the number of states literally queuing up to join it, willing 
to jump through the myriad hoops of the accession process in order to do so. 
Intuitively, EU openness to new applications, and willingness to embrace new 
members, will strengthen its soft power. Conversely, when the EU has acted in 
a closed or dismissive fashion, or has indulged in discourses about ‘enlargement 
fatigue’, it can damage the EU’s image and soft power.  
EU soft power is also present in its pursuit of milieu goals through the ENP 
and EaP.157 The agenda for cooperation under these frameworks is very much 
defined by the EU – economic reform, good governance, democracy, human 
rights, the rule of law, etc. Obviously, as with all milieu goals, these objectives 
combine enlightened EU self-interest with positive long-term impact for the 
partner states, yet they can also, at the same time, both benefit from and boost 
EU soft power. The soft power derived through EU single market governance 
has already been demonstrated in an interesting case study of energy market 
regulations, which has been transferred to non-EU countries. 158 The EU’s 
attempts to embrace civil society in the ENP countries – especially prominent in 
the 2012 upgrade159 – shows awareness of the same logics as Joseph Nye 
outlined.  
Although one cannot simply take all EU rhetoric about its positive global 
role at face value, the EU evidently places great rhetorical emphasis on values 
in its foreign policies. However, rather than debate whether the EU’s policies 
live up to a specific standard of ‘normative actorness’, the bigger question is 
what values are actually conveyed and how these are received abroad. The 
likelihood of these being sources of soft power must be determined through the 
EU’s consistency in their promotion. This approach opens the question why the 
EU is often inconsistent and how such inconsistency affects its soft power. The 
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related question is whether the EU shows sufficient cultural sensitivity in its 
value promotion, or whether it is perceived as preachy and off-putting. The 
answer is in the eye of the beholder, and can be analysed as such. The emphasis 
on social tolerance and promotion human rights inside the EU is, to some exter-
nal actors at least, a source soft power. The EU’s insistence on Ukrainian gay 
rights legislation as a precondition for visa free travel is one small example of 
principled behaviour.160 That Islamic extremists bemoan Europe’s ‘degenerate 
lack of morality’, or Vladimir Putin’s Russia has labelled the EU ‘Gayropa’, 
only proves the general point that what constitutes attraction in one cultural 
context may not do so in others. How the EU’s relative silence on much greater 
human rights violations elsewhere, not least in China or the Middle East, affects 
its reputation and effectiveness are the kinds of questions that can better be 
analysed once embracing the soft power concept and moving beyond the stale 
debates over what kind of (normative or not) power the EU is.  
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
The present collection of articles 
The four articles presented here each show different aspects of these several 
themes. Between them the articles analyse soft power in the EU’s external rela-
tions from several perspectives: the broad argument about the role of soft power 
vis-à-vis traditional capabilities; the incorporation of soft power in a regional 
policy framework; the attempt to work through NGOs and civil society organi-
sations; showing how a competitor (Russia) fails to utilise its soft power, partly 
by the presence of the EU’s. The articles also offer varying perspectives, in that 
the first elaborates on the theoretical concepts and their application, while the 
other three test the theoretical framework through different cases. The strength 
of using case studies is that it allows delving into the specific contexts in which 
EU soft power has been a factor. These articles do suggest avenues for further 
research, by showing that the concept can be applied to several aspects of the 
EU’s foreign policy at different levels. Other case studies can be developed in 
several other contexts 
A certain case selection bias has been clear: All the cases are some where 
EU soft power, or the attempt to utilise it, has been most in evidence. Moreover, 
the cases are all some, where the chances of soft power having an impact was 
higher due to the target countries’ relationship with the EU or their expected 
shared interests. That does not, however, invalidate the investigation into how 
effective the EU was in making its soft power felt, nor that into the mechanisms 
by which soft power had (or failed to have) an observable impact. It does mean, 
however, that it is difficult to generalise from these cases to some in which the 
EU enjoys less intense relationships with the target country and engages less 
directly. In the following, I will briefly outline the arguments and conclusions 
of the articles, as well as offer a few additional comments on their conclusions 
with the benefit of hindsight.  
The first article, ‘EU soft power and the capability-expectations gap’, from 
2013161, presents the broad argument that soft power, although very useful in 
and of itself, is not a panacea for the EU’s difficulties of conducting a success-
ful foreign policy. In the article, I took a first stab at delineating soft power from 
other forms – something done more extensively in this introductory chapter – 
and discussed the sources of EU soft power. I framed the topic of EU soft 
power through the capability-expectations gap,162 in order to examine the utility 
the EU derived from its soft power when performing its various roles, and 
whether soft power contributed to EU capability. What I found through this 
approach, largely confirmed the warnings about wrong ideas about soft power 
replacing hard. Soft power certainly has an impact – the EU does have signifi-
cant amounts – but lack of hard power, or conspicuous successes in some roles, 
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meant that it could not be converted to influence as effectively as one would 
have imagined.  
I further argued that the evidence seemed to suggest another, not altogether 
desirable dynamic at play. The more EU soft power was in evidence, the more it 
influenced the choices of others, the more it also drove up the expectations held 
toward the EU, and the more of a demand it placed on its limited hard power 
resources. Soft power could not be strategically deployed in a targeted way, and 
could therefore not replace hard power. It needed to be underpinned by it – and 
if that did not happen, soft power could be damaged. In that sense, the article 
did challenge the EU’s official self-perception of being a sui generis actor 
capable of living without hard power. Most importantly, the article showed that 
the concept of soft power can be used for analysis of EU power resources and 
power conversion. It provided a useful dimension to the analysis of the EU’s 
successes and failures as an actor, and underscored the importance of main-
taining a balanced set of tools for exercising power. Lastly, the article sketched 
out several themes that future research on EU soft power can develop further. 
The broad argument remains valid, recent years having provided no shortage 
of examples to make the point. To name one, the migration crisis at the South-
ern border since 2011 – which dramatically peaked in 2015 – has several of the 
same elements. Europe arguable holds great attraction as the ‘city on the Hill’, 
as a place of peace and prosperity. Yet, when faced with millions of people 
wanting a part of this peace and prosperity, the EU’s capability for acting has 
been disappointing to virtually all. It has not strengthened its reputation, neither 
for humanitarianism, nor for decisiveness in crisis management. The few pro-
posals that have been on the table, such as sinking the human traffickers’ boats, 
may even undermine EU soft power.163 Nor, for that matter, has it gained much 
respect for its inability to even uphold its own laws and internal agreements. 
Moreover, its lack of pro-active policies towards the root causes of the refugee 
problems – such as the ongoing wars in Libya and Syria – has not done much 
for its soft power.  
The war in Ukraine since the beginning of 2014 has been another textbook 
example of the same dynamics. EU soft power was having a noticeable, if not 
quite the intended effect during the early stages of the Euromaidan uprising. 
That hundreds of thousands of people braved the freezing cold to protest the 
cancellation of the Association Agreement was surely an indicator of people 
wanting what Europe offered.164 The revolution over, Ukrainians expected the 
EU to throw its weight behind their aspirations, not least once Russia invaded 
the country. Whether the EU ever intended to give that impression is beside the 
point. The problem of soft power is that one cannot “…always [control] what 
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against Viktor Yanukovych’s authoritarian kleptocracy. For a full-length treatment of the 
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the target hears”.165 The rapid developments, however, laid bare the gap 
between the expectations held towards the EU by outside actors (and some 
internal ones too) and the EU’s capability for meeting such expectations. The 
EU was unable to impose more than signalling sanctions on the Russian aggres-
sor – and even on that consensus remains fragile – nor to check its actions 
effectively by other means. Soft power did its initial job, but the hard power to 
match it was not there, and the EU’s reputation in Ukraine has suffered as a 
result.166 Meanwhile, Ukraine has paid a heavy price for acting on the attraction 
of ‘Europe’.  
The second article, ‘The EU’s Eastern Partnership: Soft Power or Policy 
Failure’, written with Maili Vilson in 2014, ties soft power specifically to the 
EU’s efforts in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the way the EU sought to make 
its Eastern Partnership a channel for its soft power.167 The article took as its 
starting point the stated ambition of EU officials to place soft power at the heart 
of the policy. We placed this soft power emphasis in the context of the EU’s 
milieu goals, as these are expressed in the various strategy documents. We then 
critically discussed to what extent the EU has succeeded in converting its soft 
power into a successful strategy. The article is therefore an example of concrete 
research into the incorporation of soft power into EU policy towards a specific 
region. 
We concluded that the Eastern Partnership ultimately fails in its soft power 
purpose, as too little thought has been given to the mechanisms for accom-
plishing the milieu goals. However, it is important to note that we considered 
the policy itself the problem, not the EU’s soft power. The ambiguous nature of 
the policy itself was part of the problem, as it was a disappointment to those 
wanting a membership perspective. It moreover offered rather little assurance 
for those potentially wanting to strengthen relations with the EU but fearing 
cost of doing so. For those not really interested, there was nothing to make them 
change their minds. The policy has failed with most of the partners, because it 
tried to cover too many internal contradictions, and as a result, the EU failed to 
fully develop an actually considerable reservoir of soft power.  
The article’s section on Ukraine ended on an awkward note – the outcome of 
the Euromaidan uprising was still very much in doubt when we submitted the 
final version at the end of December 2013.168 Whether willingness by the EU to 
sign the agreement with Ukraine sooner – which the article argued for – would 
have made any difference to the subsequent events is a question that has divided 
opinion. Would Russia have reacted differently if the EU had been more deter-
mined to engage Ukraine? Was Viktor Yanukovych ever sincere in his desire to 
move closer to the EU? Could the EU have resolved the dilemma between lev-
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eraging soft power by engaging, and being seen as rewarding bad behaviour? 
We will obviously never know, and very possibly the outcome would have been 
the same. Yet, the fact remains that the EU did stall for almost 18 months, and 
was passive while Ukraine was facing severe Russian bullying.169 The overall 
message of the article remains valid and is supported by subsequent develop-
ments. The verdict of failure on the EaP can seem harsh; Ukraine, after all, 
braved Russia’s onslaught to begin implementation of its Association Agree-
ment, and Georgia and Moldova both signed their agreements too. All three 
countries have made clear, however, that they consider these agreements as 
stepping-stones to even closer relations and eventual membership. EU soft 
power may play a role, and some milieu goals may be secured through the pol-
icy, but the EaP is only a stopgap solution to a larger question that will not go 
away.  
The third article, ‘Undiscovered Avenues: Estonian Civil Society Organisa-
tions as Agents of Europeanisation’, written with Eiki Berg and Gulnara Roll in 
2009, shows the EU’s attempts at engaging civil society organisations in order 
to promote its Europeanising agenda.170 Europeanization is best understood as 
the way the EU effects domestic change in third countries, helping these to 
‘download’ policies and norms.171 It is therefore a process that helps achieve the 
very milieu goals the EU seeks to promote through policies like the ENP.172 The 
article shows the EU trying to channel its soft power in a bottom-up manner, 
supporting low-level initiatives to effect change. By setting up framework 
programmes and making funding available, the EU both sought to strengthen 
civil society in the then-new member states, and encouraged civil society 
organisations to forge links with likeminded organisations in neighbouring 
countries.  
We found that such organisations were generally perceived as less ‘political’ 
than government initiatives, and hence more acceptable as partners. Coopera-
tion was particularly active in the field of environmental policy, but also in 
furthering cultural and business links. The Estonian civil society organisations 
also took on roles in furthering democracy and human rights awareness in other 
former Soviet states, such as Ukraine. The organisations contributed to an 
enabling environment for EU influence.173 The soft power and Europeanising 
potential of this approach therefore seemed evident. We did also point out, 
however, that this approach entailed certain difficulties. One such is that the EU 
itself is not very nimble and flexible in its dealings with NGOs, much energy 
being wasted on form filling and administration. As could be expected, the 
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organisations that received EU support also had their own agenda, and whether 
they strengthened the EU brand or their own is not clear. We also pointed to the 
possibility of the governments in the target states putting obstacles in the way of 
civil society cooperation, and putting various forms of pressure on the non-state 
sectors. 
Perhaps this last point was underestimated at the time, making the article 
sound, perhaps, too optimistic from today’s perspective in its confidence in 
what could be achieved through engagement with civil society. The determina-
tion of the Kremlin to stamp out all foreign influence – not least by labelling 
and prosecuting many NGOs as being ‘foreign agents – and the extent to which 
such repression can work was not fully foreseen. The enabling environment 
which civil society can create can also be disrupted quite effectively by deter-
mined governments. The kinds of ripple effects from civil society cooperation 
that we expected are perhaps unlikely to be as automatic as we imagined. On 
the other hand, although the exact influence of the EU in strengthening civil 
society through encouraging cooperation between NGOs is not easy to estab-
lish, in more welcoming environments such cooperation flourished. While civil 
society withered in Russia it flourished in Ukraine, creating bottom-up pres-
sures for societal reform. As with soft power influence in most cases, exact 
causation can rarely be conclusively proven, but it can certainly be inferred. 
The fourth article, written with Heiko Pääbo in 2015, provides a counter-
point by showing the limitations of Russian soft power vis-à-vis Estonia.174 
Intuitively, one would think Russia had tremendous soft power resources at its 
disposal, not least through the presence of the large Russophone minority. In 
public discourse, this situation has often been discussed in securitising terms. In 
the article, we examined these sources, focusing especially on the role of edu-
cation, culture, and mass media. Estonian minority and language policies were 
also considered in terms of their influence on the political orientation of the 
minority population. The article also discusses the difference between soft 
power and Russian hybrid war tactics, like those seen in Ukraine since 2014, 
arguing that while the former can provide a good starting point for the latter, the 
latter is not an expression of the former. The two really are quite distinct, hybrid 
war being a clear question of hard power behaviour.  
Our conclusion was quite clear; Russia does not have the kind of soft power 
often imagined. Values can both attract and repel, that is one important lesson 
of soft power. Although the Russophone minorities may not be entirely content 
in the country, and while the sense of cultural community may be stronger with 
Russia, Putin’s venal and authoritarian, not to say fascist kleptocracy holds little 
attraction. For all its flaws, in the eyes of the minorities, Estonia is preferable. 
Arguably, this can also be explained by economic factors,175 and may simply 
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show that hard power trumps soft.176 Yet, the EU has helped Estonia shore up 
its ability to secure the loyalty of its population. The union was instrumental in 
softening some Estonian minority policies in the 1990s, and the minority popu-
lations consider it positively. Those norms and values that form a big part of the 
EU’s soft power externally also has an impact in negating the possible soft 
power advantages of Russia. In other cases, states not yet members of the EU 
(e.g. Moldova or Armenia), the context may be different and Putin’s regime 
associated with order and stability as opposed to chaos. The soft power may 
play differently there. Yet in the specific case, we concluded that Russian soft 
power in Estonia, and by extension in other EU members, is only a limited 
threat.  
 
 
Concluding remarks  
This dissertation in no way aims to be the definitive word on EU soft power, 
quite the contrary. The hope is rather that it has shown just how many possibili-
ties the soft power concept offers for understanding aspects of EU attractiveness 
and EU foreign policy. Some areas have already seen some research conducted, 
others are still waiting to be explored. Likewise, EU policies towards other parts 
of the world than Eastern Europe present different contexts in which EU soft 
power may or may not be in evidence. The exact mixing of power resources for 
effective power conversion strategies in different context also opens interesting 
avenues for further research.  
The time is long past to continue probing whether and how the EU as an 
international actor conforms to more or less otherworldly ideal types. European 
power, or at least the potential for it, is real, and both the EU and its member 
states exercise what power they can in the world for their own interests. In spite 
of its difficulties in crafting successful power conversion strategies, the EU is 
slowly but steadily becoming a ‘normal’ actor, with all that that implies. There-
fore, it makes increasingly little sense to continue using exclusive conceptual 
niches for studying EU foreign policy. The best way to study the EU is by ana-
lysing what it does, by what means and by what measure of success. Nothing 
else really tells us a lot. By engaging with mainstream IR concepts, EU scholars 
can make better comparisons with other powers. It was one thing to argue that 
the US is not a normative power, but the label was also questionable for the EU. 
Both, however, enjoy significant soft power; but how do their soft power and 
power convergence strategies measure up? And how does EU soft power fare in 
competition with that of the BRICs and others? Does Europe still look as 
attractive in Africa as before, now that the Chinese are entering? How does 
European soft power weather the changing global balance of power in both the 
political and economic sphere? Will it be true for the EU – as it was for the US 
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in the late 1980’s, when Joseph Nye first coined the term – that soft power will 
offset many other aspects of relative slipping in traditional power relations? 
The soft concept offers a way for researchers to study the intangible ele-
ments of EU power, while using the tools and concepts of traditional IR schol-
arship. All without falling into the trap of ideological value judgement and nor-
mative prescriptiveness that the normative power framework in particular suf-
fers from. The EU makes for an interesting research object in this, as it certainly 
possesses much soft power, and a wide-ranging research agenda can be mapped 
out. Thus, although ‘soft power Europe’ is still something of a misnomer, 
among the several ‘contradiction in terms’-models of power discussed in this 
introductory chapter, it is the lesser one. The following articles show various 
aspects of the soft power concept’s usefulness for understanding EU power and 
EU foreign policy. 
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50 
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Pehme jõu Euroopa:  
Väiksem vastuolu terminoloogias ja praktikas 
Käesolev väitekiri arutleb Euroopa Liidu pehme jõu avalduste üle teoorias ja 
praktikas. Autor distantseerub teadlikult dominantsetest paradigmadest EL-i 
välispoliitika uurimisel. Nii „tsiviiljõu Euroopa“ kui „normatiivse jõu Euroopa“ 
seletuslikud mudelid olid enamjaolt elujõulistena kasutusel 1970. aastate algu-
sest kuni 2000. aastate esimese pooleni. Need mõlemad käsitlused sündisid 
tagasivaatelisena Euroopa integratsioonile ja on seetõttu läbi aegade olnud 
teaduslikus mõttes inspiratsiooniallikaks paljudele. Samas ei saa mööda minna 
kitsaskohtadest ja kriitikast eeltoodud käsitluste aadressil. Nimelt, mitte kum-
magil neist pole ette näidata tõsist teoreetilist ja empiirilist alusmaterjali. Samuti 
ei ole need käsitlused jõudnud juurduda väljapoole Euroopa integratsiooni-
alaseid uuringuid. Seevastu on pehme jõu käsitlus jäänud teenimatult varju 
selles uurimisvaldkonnas. 
Selle väitekirja keskse teesi kohaselt muutuvad EL-i välispoliitika üksikasjad 
märksa arusaadavamaks siis, kui loobutakse varasematest eksklussiivsetest, 
ainult EL-i integratsiooni puudutavatest seletusviisidest laiemalt tunnustust 
leidnud rahvusvaheliste suhete alaste teoreetiliste käsitluste kasuks. Sellisest 
vaatenurgast lähtuvalt on EL-l olemas pehme jõu omadused ja võimekus neid 
omadusi praktikas realiseerida. Pehme jõu omadused avalduvad toimija kul-
tuuris, väärtushinnangutes ja poliitikates. Et neid mittematerjaalseid omadusi 
”võimendada” ja praktikas maksma panna, peavad need muutuma atraktiivse-
teks neile, kellele soovitakse mõju avaldada. Iga toimija rahvusvahelisel areenil 
omab erinevas koguses ja kombinatsioonis teiste mõjutamiseks vajalikke mõju-
vahendeid. Nii saab EL-i välispoliitilist võimekust käsitleda läbi materjaalsete 
(loe: sõjaliste) ja mittematerjaalsete (loe: kultuur ja väärtushinnangud) mõju-
vahendite avaldumiste ja atraktiivsuse prisma. Autor kaitseb seisukohta, et 
pehme jõu käsitlus sobib paremini EL-i välispoliitika mõtestamiseks võrreldes 
konkureerivate alternatiividega, milleks on „tsiviiljõu Euroopa” ja „normatiivse 
jõu Euroopa“ käsitlused, sest erinevalt ideaalist (milline peaks olema EL 
toimijana rahvusvahelistes suhetes) on põhjust vaadata tegelikkusele otsa (mis 
laadi jõuga on EL-i puhul tegemist ja mis on EL-i võimekus ennast rahvus-
vahelistes suhetes teostada). 
Väitekiri tugineb neljale eelretsenseeritud artiklile, mis avaldatud ajavahe-
mikul 2009–2016 rahvusvahelise levikuga teadusajakirjades. Sissejuhatav pea-
tükk tutvustab teoreetilisi ja metodoloogilisi aspekte EL-i olemuse mõistmisel 
rahvusvaheliste suhete toimijana. Väitekirja koondatud artiklitest esimene arut-
leb EL-i pehme jõu olemuse seostest võimekuse-ootuste lõhega. Teises artiklis 
uuritakse EL-i Idapartnerluse programmi eduväljavaateid pehme jõu funktsio-
neerimisel. Kolmandas artiklis analüüsitakse valitsusväliste organisatsioonide 
agentsust EL-i välispoliitika toimijatena. Neljas artikkel vastandab Venemaa pehme 
jõu avaldumised EL-i omale ja demonstreerib selle vähest atraktiivsust Eestis. 
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